Elizabeth Anderson’s principle of democratic equality or relational equality is a pluralistic view of equality that demands changes in the kind of relationships that exist between peoples. It states that the causes of social hierarchy (and therefore inequality) are various, which requires different strategies to neutralize. The causes of the social hierarchy might be due to esteem, domination, and standing. This might manifest itself in forms of oppression and inequalities of — race, gender, class, and caste. Democratic equality is better equipped to address these problems of social hierarchy and oppression than distributional equality.
Anderson’s Relational Equality focuses on equality as a social relationship. In such a realm of focus, the plausible set of solutions to resolve these inequalities expands from a mere redistribution of goods to — change other possible aspects of society. Even if relational equality chooses the path of distribution of goods as a solution, it emphasizes that a single strategy of distribution of only one good is not sufficient to tackle the problems of relational equality. This definition of equality is more pluralistic than John Rawls’s distributive principles of justice. Anderson, in her paper (Anderson, 1999) tears into the distributive principle of justice. She says it is primarily based on luck and not on socially manifested oppression. She says that their focus on luck, natural endowments (talents, looks, ability), financial endowments (wealth inheritance), brute luck (other lucks not in control of the individual) and option luck ( caused by so-called choice) ignores the more persistent hierarchies of oppression fabricated by human beings( genocide, lynching on account of identity, stigmatizing, etc.) Even in trying to tackle natural luck, they (luck egalitarians) do it with solutions that do not imbibe the core principles of equality. She systematically lays out how luck egalitarians do more harm than good. In tackling one kind of inequality, they completely ignore that the same inequality manifests itself in some other way in different areas, which is out of the scope of focus of luck egalitarians. They will never be able to tackle the problem of inequalities unless they troubleshoot the relations between peoples.
Rawls’s difference principle fits into the description of luck egalitarianism. Rawls’s difference principle, which is the second part of the second principle, i.e., Social and Economic inequalities are to be arranged in such a manner that they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantages members of society (the difference principle). Rawls’s focus on inequality is on income and wealth. Anderson points out this is a very narrow outlook of inequality and not consistent with the realities of life. Two compelling examples of contrasting these two approaches — a gay man endowed with wealth from his parents. Under Rawls, the wealth this man is endowed is not deserved and is to be redistributed. It completely ignores the oppression and stigmatization this man faces in the society on account of perceived notions of being gay. It ignores the fact that this man is not able to identify himself as gay freely. This is an attack on his basic human liberty to function as an equal in society. It compromises the self-respect of the man by ignoring this reality and instead imposes the idea that being endowed with the riches is to be “penalized”. It enforces the idea that being comparatively poor in life is less worth living. This notion might not be subscribed by everyone poor, but luck egalitarians make sure that it becomes a universal notion to look down on people with fewer riches. According to Anderson, this is not a pragmatic approach. Another example involves billionaires like Jeff Bezos. Anderson emphasizes that the point of contention is not the disparity in the income or wealth Jeff earns, but in how he treats his workers. Numerous reports are out that people working for him — are peeing in bottles instead of a washroom break. This treatment of them is against their basic human function of relieving oneself. No human should be substituting their bodily functions just because their boss is providing them with a job at a high-end company. Rawls’s idea of inequality stresses more the income disparity than the maltreatment. His difference principle in this situation focuses on the worker’s income. It says that income disparity can be accepted if the worker’s job and pay are better than his/her previous jobs. This previous and post status of the worker has nothing to do with basic human dignity and self-respect. Anderson’s democratic equality emphasizes these basic human dignities, which allows him/her to function as an equal in society. It provides this to the individual throughout his lifetime and is not conditioned upon mere income. Many such arguments have been leveled upon Rawls. To his defense, he states that the difference principle is a macro concept and is pertaining to a just basic structure of society, rather than stand-alone situations (Rawls, 1974) . However, it still lies in the realm of distributional equality rather than relational equality.
Anderson emphasizes that the distributional strategy will not help solve the systemic oppression and hierarchical systems existing in society. But this does not mean that democratic equality completely ignores the strategy of distribution. It only expands the set of probable solutions. It requires that everyone has adequate access to resources to avoid being oppressed by others and enable functioning as an equal in civil society. The focus on income and wealth is not the primary cause of concern. Rawls’s basic currency of equality is the primary goods. Anderson focuses on the non-negotiable access to a basic set of capabilities and functionings to realize their agency.
Anderson further levels heavy criticisms on luck egalitarians, which can be extended to Rawls too. Luck Egalitarians treat adverse consequences of option luck very harshly. Anderson levels that many aspects of life are out of the scope of human responsibility, and their basic human dignity should not be compromised even if adverse consequences arise out of choice. Democratic equality respects the moral worth of a human being and provides access to resources throughout the lifetime, without being paternalistic. Second, unlike the luck egalitarians, it does so without the essence of pity. It provides solutions for inequality not because of people’s perceived inferior status (as in the case of luck egalitarians ), but because they are equals. Anderson explicitly puts Rawls to task too :
“In giving absolute priority to the worst off, the difference principle might require considerable sacrifices in the lower middle ranks for trifling gains at the lowest levels. Democratic equality would urge a less demanding form of reciprocity. Once all citizens enjoy a decent set of freedoms, sufficient for functioning as an equal in society, income inequalities beyond that point do not seem so troubling in themselves”.
She levels that more focus on the least advantaged ignores the realities and inequalities among the middle and even higher ranks, which goes against the ideals of egalitarians altogether. After all, a middle-income Dalit person still faces ostracization on account of the perceived stigma associated with his caste. Furthermore, an important distinction is that democratic equality provides non-negotiable access to resources to ensure human’s moral worth. Whereas Rawls principle stress on the distribution patterns. By stressing more on access rather than explicit distribution, the democratic principle enables the person to own up to their responsibilities. This helps to nullify the strong incentive of a person to portray his situation as worse and reinforce his perceived inferior status (to avail goods), which distributional system actively fuels. Democratic equality refuses to publicly endorse the demeaning private judgments of appearance, perceived inferior status, and other forms of basic compensation. For example, in India’s higher education public institutions, some courses like computer science in engineering and radiology in medicine are given higher status (higher rank students are allocated these courses). This effectively enforces the idea that other courses and people taking those “other” courses are inferior. The state has no place to pass insulting judgments and set such standards of reference. This has devastating consequences on the relationships between students. The government fuels individual perception as public. By intervening in a such manner, distributional ideas impose a trade-off between freedom and equality. Democratic equality on the other hand intends to view freedom and equality to coexist and enforce each other. Democratic equality provides no room for such inferior enforcement in any aspect — education, class, race, or caste.
Democratic equality emphasizes that natural misfortune is not the cause of concern but it is the fact that people shun others on the fact of their misfortune. It does not say anything about the perceived, ugly appearance of an individual. But has something to say about imposing such perceptions on people which fuel ostracization of the perceived “ugly”. The people’s evil actions (such as bullying) on account of the perceived status of appearance, identity, talent are unjust. One advantage of democratic equality through the capability approach is that it allows us to analyze injustices in matters other than the distribution of resources and other divisible goods.
One aspect on which Rawls and Anderson agree on is that we live in a system of co-operative production. But they diverge on how this co-operation is to be achieved. Rawls’s strategy says that natural talent, abilities, and endowments of the well-off are to be put to use to elevate the status of the least advantaged. Anderson’s idea involves the obligation of people to acknowledge the existence and the moral worth of individuals and treat them with dignity and respect. Democratic equality applies judgments of justice to the human arrangement, not to the natural orders.
References
Altham, J. E. J. (1973). Rawls’s Difference Principle. Philosophy, 48(183), 75–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100060447
Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897
Heller, N. (n.d.). The Philosopher Redefining Equality. 24.
Rawls, J. (1974). Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion. The American Economic Review, 64(2), 141–146.
